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proxmox-scripts/README.md
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security: version the CIS Tier-A hardening pass
The script that sets the SSH, PAM, pwquality and auditd baseline on twelve
containers existed only as a root-owned copy on the machines it hardens.
Bring it into the repo so a change reaches one place instead of twelve.

Two substantive changes over the copy that shipped on 2026-07-24:

- Deny forwarding per option instead of via DisableForwarding. Same effect,
  but DisableForwarding overrides every other forwarding option and is
  invisible in sshd -T, which makes a rejected port-forward read as a
  configuration that should work.
- Quote the command substitution in MODDIR (SC2046).

The header and README now record the rollout command, the containers left
unhardened as break-glass foundation, and why host-specific exceptions must
live in a drop-in that sorts after 99-cis-hardening.conf.
2026-08-19 11:02:15 +02:00

108 lines
9.1 KiB
Markdown

# luki-net / proxmox-scripts
Community-script-style installers for LXC services in the luki-net Proxmox VE homelab. Each script creates an unprivileged Debian 12 LXC and installs one specific app — sensible defaults, interactive prompts, env-overridable for non-interactive runs.
Inspired by [community-scripts/ProxmoxVE](https://github.com/community-scripts/ProxmoxVE), but minimal, self-hosted and tailored to this stack.
## Script catalog
| App | What it provisions | Status |
|-----|--------------------|--------|
| [devpi](ct/devpi.sh) | Private PyPI cache/mirror — saves time on CUDA/torch rebuilds | ✅ stable |
| [webapp](ct/webapp.sh) | Next.js site with deploy-as-code via a repo-scoped Gitea Actions runner (host mode, no inbound port) | ✅ stable |
| [nexus](ct/nexus.sh) | App LXC for [nexus](https://gitea.luki-net.org/l.kirchner/nexus-hub) (Family Knowledge Hub): host-mode runner (label `nexus`, CI + deploy), service skeleton, `/opt/nexus` layout. Runtime is provisioned/extended via [`install/nexus-runtime.sh`](install/nexus-runtime.sh) (idempotent, re-runnable) | ✅ in production |
| [nexus-db](ct/nexus-db.sh) | PostgreSQL 16 + pgvector for nexus — least-privilege role, pg_hba allowlist (only the nexus LXC), DSN handed over via credentials file | ✅ in production |
| [authentik](ct/authentik.sh) | Central homelab IdP (official Docker Compose via LXC nesting) — headless bootstrap admin **and** API token for agent-driven blueprint configuration, blueprints mount, permanent auth domain (WebAuthn RP-ID) | ✅ in production |
| [runner](ct/runner.sh) | General **instance-wide** Gitea Actions runner (label `homelab`) — Docker for throwaway CI test containers, deliberately **no** sudoers/deploy rights | ✅ in production |
Run any one-liner on a Proxmox VE host as root:
```bash
bash -c "$(curl -fsSL https://gitea.luki-net.org/luki-net/proxmox-scripts/raw/branch/main/ct/<app>.sh)"
```
## Usage
Interactive prompts cover CTID, hostname, disk, RAM, CPU, bridge/VLAN, storage, IP/gateway/DNS — plus app-specific values. Defaults are sane. Non-interactive override via env vars:
```bash
CTID=200 HOSTNAME=devpi DISK_SIZE=30 RAM=4096 CORES=4 IPCFG=dhcp \
bash -c "$(curl -fsSL https://gitea.luki-net.org/luki-net/proxmox-scripts/raw/branch/main/ct/devpi.sh)"
```
All defaults (`DEFAULT_HOSTNAME`, `DEFAULT_DISK`, …) and app config values are settable per call via env vars.
Every input is validated (digits-only for CTID/disk/cores/RAM/VLAN, IP/CIDR/gateway format, hostname/storage charsets). Invalid interactive input re-prompts — including pasted values with invisible control/non-ASCII bytes, which are rejected rather than silently stripped. Env-provided values are validated too and abort the run when malformed (no re-prompt loop in non-interactive use).
## The pattern
Two files per app, both sourcing the shared libs via `curl`:
- **`ct/<app>.sh`** runs on the PVE host: prompts → unprivileged LXC → pushes a config env file into the container → bootstraps the installer. Apps that need Docker (authentik, runner) enable `nesting+keyctl` automatically. The standard prompts include an **SSH root login choice** (`SSH_ROOT_LOGIN`, default yes for homelab convenience; `no` keeps the Debian key-only default) — applied inside the container as an sshd drop-in by `configure_ssh_root_login`.
- **`install/<app>-install.sh`** runs inside the LXC: packages, unprivileged app user, secrets generated on-host (never printed), systemd units, a `/root/<app>.credentials` notes file — then shreds the bootstrap env. Idempotent where it matters: re-runs skip what exists. `setup_base_apt` also fixes the bare-template **locale situation**: `C.UTF-8` is exported up front (glibc built-in, covers the first apt run without perl warnings), then `en_US.UTF-8` is generated and set as the system default.
**DB installers** carry one extra rule: a PostgreSQL cluster/database freezes its encoding at initdb / `CREATE DATABASE` time and it can never be changed afterwards. A C (non-UTF-8) locale yields a `SQL_ASCII` cluster — psycopg3 then hands text back as bytes and SQLAlchemy crashes. So the pattern (helpers `ensure_utf8_locale_active` + `assert_db_encoding_utf8` in `lib/install.func`) is: make a UTF-8 locale **active** before the server package runs initdb, create the database **explicitly** with `TEMPLATE template0 ENCODING 'UTF8' LC_COLLATE/LC_CTYPE 'en_US.UTF-8'` (never inherit the cluster default), and **verify** `pg_encoding_to_char` returns `UTF8` before finishing — a wrong encoding aborts the install (it's DB damage, see wiki → Lessons). Maintenance examples use `su - postgres -c …`, not `sudo` — these minimal LXCs have no sudo.
Shared libs: [`lib/build.func`](lib/build.func) (host-side: prompts, LXC create, bootstrap) and [`lib/install.func`](lib/install.func) (in-container: apt, users, systemd, http-wait).
## Security conventions
- Unprivileged LXCs only; app processes run as dedicated system users.
- Least privilege everywhere: narrow sudoers (exact-match commands — sudoers compares **verbatim incl. arguments**), DB allowlists, LAN-only binds for inference ports.
- Secrets are generated on the target host and live in `0600` files — never in the repo, the wiki or chat logs.
- **Runner separation:** the nexus runner is repo-scoped and lives on the production LXC *because* it holds deploy rights; the general `runner` LXC is instance-wide *because* it holds none. Don't mix these scopes.
### CIS Tier-A hardening
[`install/cis-tierA.sh`](install/cis-tierA.sh) applies the Tier-A baseline to an existing Debian 12 LXC: SSH drop-in, `login.defs` aging + YESCRYPT, pwquality/faillock, PAM (pwquality, pwhistory, faillock, `nullok` removed) and auditd rules. It is idempotent, backs everything up to `/root/cis-hardening-backup-<ts>/`, gates the SSH restart on `sshd -t` and rolls PAM back if a referenced module is missing.
```bash
pct push <id> install/cis-tierA.sh /root/cis-tierA.sh
pct exec <id> -- bash /root/cis-tierA.sh
```
Applied to authentik first (2026-07-24), then to 11 further containers. The PVE hosts and the Wazuh manager VM stay unhardened on purpose — they are the break-glass foundation.
Two things worth knowing before touching it:
- **Section 1 rewrites `99-cis-hardening.conf` wholesale on every run.** Host-specific exceptions belong in a separate drop-in that sorts *after* it (e.g. `99-zz-local-forward.conf`), never in that file. A `Match` block extends until the next `Match` — across `Include` file boundaries — so such a drop-in has to stay alphabetically last.
- **Forwarding is denied per option, not via `DisableForwarding`.** Both are equivalent in effect, but `DisableForwarding` overrides every other forwarding option *and* does not appear in `sshd -T` output. A denied port-forward then reports `administratively prohibited` while `sshd -T` cheerfully claims `allowtcpforwarding yes`, which costs hours to diagnose.
Caveat: auditd is a no-op in unprivileged LXCs (the host owns the audit subsystem); the script probes for it and removes the package again if it cannot load rules. Together with the Section-1 partition/kernel checks that are equally N/A in a container, the achievable SCA score stays well below 100 %.
## Contributing
**All changes go through a pull request with cross-review** (Claude Code ↔ Codex, or a human) — no direct pushes to `main`. This rule exists because of two real incidents: a pasted VLAN tag carrying an invisible non-UTF-8 byte broke `pct create` mid-run, and the "missing `source build.func`" bug shipped twice — caught in review on the nexus-db PR, but reaching production via an un-reviewed authentik commit (see wiki → Lessons).
CI (`.gitea/workflows/ci.yml`, instance-wide `homelab` runner from [ct/runner.sh](ct/runner.sh)) enforces on every PR: `bash -n` over all scripts, the "every `ct/*.sh` sources `build.func`" check ([tests/check_ct_source.sh](tests/check_ct_source.sh)) and the validation unit tests ([tests/test_validation.sh](tests/test_validation.sh)); shellcheck runs when available on the runner.
Build new app prompts on `prompt_validated`/`require_valid` from `lib/build.func` instead of bare `read`. How to add a script: [docs/adding-a-script.md](docs/adding-a-script.md).
## Repo layout
```
.
├── ct/ # Host-side scripts, one per app
├── install/ # In-container installers (+ nexus-runtime.sh re-provisioner,
│ # cis-tierA.sh hardening pass)
├── lib/
│ ├── build.func # Shared host-side helpers (prompts, LXC create, bootstrap)
│ └── install.func # Shared in-container helpers (apt, systemd, users, http-wait)
├── tests/
│ ├── test_validation.sh # Unit tests for the input validation helpers
│ └── check_ct_source.sh # Every ct/*.sh must source build.func
├── docs/
│ └── adding-a-script.md
├── README.md
└── LICENSE
```
## Related
- [nexus-hub](https://gitea.luki-net.org/l.kirchner/nexus-hub) — Family Knowledge Hub (main consumer of nexus/nexus-db/authentik/runner)
- [Wiki](https://gitea.luki-net.org/luki-net/proxmox-scripts/wiki) — per-app runbook pointers, conventions, lessons learned
## License
MIT